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CASE COMMENTS
except household or works of necessity or charity and provides a
fine of not less than ten dollars upon conviction. Section 18 makes
provision for the exclusion from section 17 of "any person who con-
scientiously believes that the seventh day of the week ought to be
observed as a Sabbath and actually refrains from all secular busi-
ness and labor on that day." W. VA. CODE ch. 61, art. 8, § 18
(Michie Supp. 1959).
While the West Virginia Sunday law appears never to have
been tested on constitutional grounds, the West Virginia Supreme
Court intimated by dicta in State v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 14 W. Va.
362 (1884), that the West Virginia Sunday law was not intended
to enforce the observance of Sunday as a religious duty and, hence,
was not a law respecting the establishment of religion. While this
appears to be the only judicial pronouncement on the constitution-
ality of West Virginia's Sunday law, the decisions in the instant
cases would seem to remove any doubt as to constitutionality. The
Virginia Supreme Court, relying upon the instant cases, has already
handed down a decision holding Sunday laws to be constitutional.
Mandell v. Haddon, 121 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1961).
Nothing really new has come forth from the Court in these
four decisions. They merely affirm the majority position developed
in this country with reference to Sunday laws. Sunday laws are to
be upheld, it would appear, not as laws of religious significance, but
as a proper exercise of the police power of the state in providing
for and safeguarding the health and welfare of the people.
Forest Jackson Bowman
Constitutional Law-Unlawful Search and Seizure--Evidence
Obtained Thereby Not Admissible in State Courts
Three police officers, looking for a person wanted in connec-
tion with some local bombings, approached D's residence and were
refused admission without a search warrant. The policemen* later
returned and forcibly gained admittance. D was then taken forcibly
upstairs where the police, in their search, found some obscene ma-
terials. D was ultimately convicted for possession of these ma-
terials. At the trial no search warrant was produced, nor was
the failure to produce one explained. The Ohio Supreme Court
ruled that, even if the evidence was unconstitutionally obtained it
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was admissible at the trial. Held, overruling Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment is inadmissible in state courts because it violates the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
It has long been recognized that evidence obtained in viola-
tion of the fourth amendment is not admissible in federal courts.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1913). Since the Weeks
case, the members of the Court have not been in accord as to the
extent of its application. The exclusionary doctrine had been limited
to the federal courts. This led to the "silver platter" doctrine under
which evidence obtained unlawfully by state officers was admissible
in federal courts. This practice was only recently held improper
in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960); see generally Com-
ment, 63 W. VA. L. REv. 56 (1961). The Mapp case now appears
to have settled, once and for all, that evidence obtained through
illegal search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment
is not admissible in either federal or state courts.
The constitutional reasoning behind the early cases was that
admission of such evidence was a violation of both the fourth and
fifth amendments. The former was violated by the unlawful search
and seizure itself, and the latter was violated since admission of
a defendant's personal papers and belongings as evidence was in
effect requiring him to testify against himself. Weeks v. United
States, supra; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1885). Until
the Mapp case, the Court had felt that the exclusionary rule was
a matter of judicial implication, and was not derived from the
explicit requirements of the fourthamendment. Wolf v. Colorado,
supra. The Mapp and Elkins cases, however, have advanced the
theory that the rights guaranteed in the fourth and fifth amendments
are absolute rights provided by the Constitution, and as such en-
forceable against the states through the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
West Virginia has long been a proponent of the exclusionary
rule and will be affected very little by the change. State v. Wills,
91 W. Va. 659, 114 S.E. 261 (1922). However, as a result of this
change at least twenty-four states will find it necessary to alter their
rules of evidence in criminal proceedings. See Elkins v. United States,
supra, appendix to the opinion of the Court, Table I, for the states
affected by the change.
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Proponents of the exclusionary rule reason that it reduces
abuses of personal rights by police officers. Even though all the
courts in this country are opposed to unlawful searches and seizures
as such, still the admissibility of evidence so obtained tends to
encourage officers to violate basic rights guaranteed by the Con-
stitution.
Those who oppose the exclusionary rule reason that its effect
is to permit many crimes to go unpunished. They maintain that
the fact that a crime has been committed and proven is sufficient
justification for admission of the evidence, and that the important
objective is punishment of the guilty. They also contend that there
are adequate remedies provided for such abuses and that the de-
fendant should not be entitled to the further benefit of the ex-
clusionary rule. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); People
v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
Problems other than the conflict on the soundness of this
decision appear almost certain to arise. The rule that evidence
obtained in violation of the fourth amendment is inadmissible
prompts the question as to just what will constitute a violation of
the fourth amendment. In Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699
(1948), the Court answered this question in part by saying it is
a cardinal rule that a search warrant must be obtained wherever
possible. However, just two years later, in United States v. Rabino-
witz, 239 U.S. 56 (1950), the Court overruled this case and held
the test is not whether it was reasonable to obtain a warrant, but
rather, whether the search itself is reasonable.
Another problem has already arisen in Bolger v. Cleary, 293
F.2d 368 (2d Cir. 1961), wherein the evidence was obtained, in
violation of a federal statute. The district court issued an injunction
forbidding a federal officer and a waterfront official to testify in
the criminal prosecution or at the State Waterfront Commission
proceedings against the defendant. The appellate court expressed
the view that this injunction may not have been necessary under
the exclusionary rule- of -the Mapp case, which leaves .unresolved
several issues such as its application to federal statutes or rules, and
to state administrative proceedings. The dissenting opinion says it
clearly applies only to violations of the fourth amendment.
In Williams v. Ball, 294 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1961), the court
held that the Mapp case did not require it to exclude evidence
procured in violation of the Federal Communications Act. This
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case relies on Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1960), which
held the rule in Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952), that
evidence obtained in violation of a federal statute is admissible in
state courts, is still in effect. Whether or not the Schwartz case,
which relied heavily on Wolf v. Colorado, supra, is still the law
remains to be seen.
The Mapp rule has been discussed in two other recent cases.
In Marcus v. Property Search Warrants, 367 U.S. 717 (1961), the
Court held that evidence obtained by a general search warrant issued
in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments was inad-
missible in a criminal proceeding. In People v. Figueroa, 30 U.S.L.
WEEK 2158 (Kings County Ct., N.Y. Sept. 30, 1961), the county
court held that a prisoner could not attack his pre-Mapp conviction
by showing that it was based on illegally obtained evidence since
Mapp's ban on states' use of such evidence applies prospectively
only.
In Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), the Court held
that evidence obtained unlawfully by the use of a stomach pump
was a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court recognized Wolf v. Colorado, supra, but held that
this type of search and seizure shocked the conscience of the Court
and offended its sense of fair play. The fact that the search and
seizure in the Mapp case was similarly shocking may tend to give
grounds for distinguishing Mapp from the general line of cases and
put it in line with Rochin v. California, supra. However, by the
same token, the fact that the Court did not rely on the Rochin
case may be even a greater reason for believing that the Court
did what it intended to do, overrule Wolf v. Colorado.
Regardless of whether the exclusionary rule is good or bad,
it is clear that the Court in attempting to settle and clarify the law
may have in fact further confused it. The cases decided since the
Mapp case show confusion as to the scope and application of the
rule. Thus while this exclusionary rule has resolved one problem,
it has created new problems with respect to its scope and application.
John Templeton Kay, Jr.
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